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Abstract 
Previous studies have argued that commercial banks are more efficient in making and 
recovering loans than are development banks. Few studies, however, directly compare the 
efficiency of the two types of banks operating in the same market area. This study in 
Bangladesh made such a comparison. A normalized profit function was estimated based on 
the data collected from rural bank branches for the years 1987 and 1988. The results 
showed that the nationalized commercial bank branches were relative price efficient with 
respect to wages, while the development bank branches were relative price efficient with 
respect to deposit interest rates. The development bank branches were relative technical 
efficient with respect to loans made, while there was no technical efficiency differences 
between the two bank types with respect to deposits. These results suggest that the issue 
of relative bank efficiency is unique to each country and cannot be easily generalized. 
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In many developing countries, both agricultural development banks and commercial 
banks are used to disburse subsidized funds to agriculture. But policy makers, donor 
agencies and academicians are usually more concerned with the performance of develop-
ment banks than with commercial banks because of the high social costs of subsidies 
associated with development bank operations and their frequent failures during the 1980s 
(McKean). It is often assumed that commercial banks have different objectives and 
standards than development banks and, therefore, are more efficient. But are commercial 
banks really more efficient than development banks in rural financial markets in developing 
countries? The answer to this question has policy implications for efforts to improve the 
performance of rural financial markets. But there have been few studies that carefully test 
the relative efficiency of rural commercial and development banks. As a result, the 
suggestion that commercial banks are more efficient may be an exaggeration and a policy 
to expand them at the expense of development banks may not necessarily lead to a more 
efficient performance of rural financial markets. 
It is frequently argued in the rural finance literature that development banks are not 
efficient because of (a) high default rates (Von Pischke); (b) financial indiscipline due to 
political intervention in their operations (Blair; Kane; Von Pischke); and (c) imperfect 
1 
2 
' 
information and high costs of supervision (Bourne and Graham; Cuevas and Graham; 
Graham and Bourne). Some research has provided empirical evidence suggesting that 
commercial banks perform better than development banks in some countries (e.g., Cuevas 
and Graham; Graham and Bourne). This evidence is rather questionable, however, because 
most studies have failed to directly compare commercial and development banks operating 
in the same market area, and have not explicitly recognized the differences in lending 
behavior and loan portfolios between the two bank types. The share of rural loans to total 
loans is often much smaller in commercial banks than in development banks. As a result, 
the findings of these studies may be misleading and may not be generalizable beyond the 
specific countries for which they were conducted. Strong policy conclusions can only be 
generated by analyzing rural bank data that compares different types of banks operating in 
the same or very similar market areas. 
This study is unique because it analyzes rural bank data from commercial and 
development bank branches in Bangladesh to directly test the relative economic efficiency 
of the two types of banks. The data used in the study refer to 1987 and 1988 when the 
country was heavily involved in targeted rural loan programs through both types of banks. 
THE BANGLADESH RURAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
There have been several structural changes in the Bangladesh banking system since 
1971. All banks, except foreign banks, were nationalized in March, 1972, and six commercial 
banks were created out of 12 nationalized commercial banks (NCBs). In addition, there are 
three development banks - one for industrial development and two for agricultural 
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development. Agricultural development banks have been operating in rural areas since 1962. 
Following the policy of bank privatization adopted by the government in 1981, there are now 
14 privately-owned banks in Bangladesh. But except for the two denationalized private 
banks, the newly created private banks have no branchs in rural areas. Therefore, the rural 
financial market essentially consists of the nationalized commercial and agricultural 
development bank branches. 
Prior to 1977, rural bank branches constituted about 45 percent of all bank branches 
operating in the country. During the period 1978-81, the banks were required to open two 
new branches in rural areas for every new urban branch opened under a "two-for-one" 
branching policy designed to effectively disburse 1,000 million taka in special agricultural 
credit. Following suspension of this policy in 1981, the growth rate in new rural branches 
declined. Because of these policies, rural branches constituted 68 percent of the total bank 
branches by 1988. 
Commercial banks generally consider rural lending to be a risky business. But as a 
result of the branching policy during the 1978-81 period, the NCBs were forced to open 
branches in rural areas in order to gain licenses to open the more attractive urban branches 
they desired. Currently, about 70 percent of the NCB and 91 percent of the agricultural 
development bank branches are defined as rural. But only 24 percent of the total NCB loan 
portfolio is rural and their share of total rural lending is only 34 percent (Bangladesh Bank). 
Because of their experience in rural lending over three decades, there are reasons to believe 
that the development banks may be more efficient in rural lending than the commercial 
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banks. If true, this would make the Bangladesh experience somewhat different than that 
found in some other developing countries. 
ANALYZING ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 
A bank is economically efficient if it operates with both technical and price efficiency 
(Richard and Villanueva). Lau and Yotopoulos argue that technical efficiency accounts for 
differences in output level given a set of production inputs, and price efficiency accounts for 
a differential degree of profit maximization by equating the marginal value product of each 
factor to its price. Consider the production function of two banks: 
Ql = AIF(Xl) 
02 = AzF(Xz) 
where Q is output, A is a technical efficiency parameter, X is a vector of inputs employed, 
and F refers to the production function. Subscripts 1 and 2 refer to banks 1 and 2. 
A bank is said to be more technically efficient than another if it produces a larger 
output from the same set of inputs. If A1 > A2, then bank 1 is more technically efficient than 
bank 2. A bank is price efficient if it maximizes profit, i.e., equates the marginal value 
product of each factor to its price. It is possible for a bank to be technically efficient but not 
price efficient. This could be the case in Bangladesh where rural bank branches are largely 
those of public sector banks, and where interest rates are determined by the Bangladesh 
Bank (central bank) and are uniform across all banks. 
The usual marginal condition of profit maximization does not hold for banks that are 
price inefficient and that pursue diverse goals other than profit maximization. In this 
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situation, the marginal conditions as provided by Lau, and Lau and Y otopoulos are given 
by 
P(A!a(jjaxJ) = ~lji 
where, i,j,r,K, respectively, refer to input type, bank type, input price, and a constant 
parameter to distinguish between profit maximizing and non-profit maximizing firms. If K= 1, 
then the bank is a profit maximizer. If K~ 1, then the bank is not a profit maximizer and 
equates marginal revenue with a constant K times the price of inputs. Lau argues that this 
revised marginal productivity rule is consistent with over-or-under valuation of the 
opportunity costs of resources, and the satisficing behavior of a firm. 
BEHAVIOR OF RURAL BANK BRANCHES IN BANGLADESH 
The rural bank branches make two general types of loans - refinanciable target loans, 
Lr, and non-target commercial loans, L71r. The target loans are associated with government 
sponsored loan programs while non-target loans are made using each bank's own lending 
criteria. There is diversity in target loans in terms of types and interest rates: 20 types of 
target loans are offered at seven different interest rates. Most are agriculturally related and 
carry a 16 percent interest rate. Not all types of target loans are made by all bank branches, 
however, because of differences in enterprises found in different market areas (Khalily). 
The local branch managers select target loan borrowers based on their creditworthiness and 
in accordance with the terms and conditions set by the Bangladesh Bank. The selection of 
non-target loan borrowers, however, follows individual bank policies since these are 
commercial loans usually made out of deposits or borrowings from urban branches. Interest 
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rates on non-target loans vary between 16 and 20 percent. Interest rates on both target and 
non-target loans are set by the Central Bank and are uniform across bank branches. Rural 
branches, in addition to making target and non-target loans, provide risk-free loans to their 
head offices, Lt., which represent residual loanable funds after making target and non-target 
loans. The rural branches can also borrow from their head offices, Bh, when the amount of 
deposits mobilized (D) is insufficient to meet the demand for target and non-target loans. 
Interest rates on ~ and Bh are lower than the rate paid on savings deposits and are set by 
the head offices. 
Given the fact that the government uses target loan programs and intervenes in rural 
loan allocation and recovery to achieve political objectives (Blair; Khaled; Khalily and 
Meyer), the probability of default for target loans, 8-r, is expected to be greater than the 
probability of default for non-target commercial loans, 8rJ-r. Generally, most target loan 
borrowers repay loans. Honest borrowers may not be able to repay loans on time because 
of production fluctuations or unforseen contingencies, but it is expected that they will 
eventually repay their loans. Meyer and Srinivasan, using data for short term loans for the 
period 1979-84 from 89 rural bank branches, showed that about 70 percent of the loan 
principal was recovered within five years after the due date. Borrowers under the political 
protection of their sponsors, however, can escape repayment or repay at a slower rate. 
Khaled showed that elected chairmen and members of rural local government units, who 
are the most powerful persons in terms of rural power structure, often did not repay their 
loans but no legal action was taken against them. Not only did they default on their own 
loans, they were also instrumental in supporting their clients to not repay their loans. 
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Therefore, losses incurred on target loans are essentially due to political intervention and 
are exogenous to the rural bank branches. On the other hand, political intervention in non-
target loan allocation and recovery is much less, so the loss rate is much lower. 
It is expected that rural bank branch managers consider effective interest rates, 
adjusted for loan loss, when allocating financial resources. The loss adjusted target loan 
interest rate is defined as p.,. and the loss adjusted non-target rate as Prrr· Interest rates on 
loans to and from head offices are the same and may be expressed as a single price of 
netput (~-Bh). The interest rate on netput for the NCB branches is 12.5 percent, while it 
is 10.5 percent for the development bank branches. About 65 percent of the NCB rural 
branches are net lenders to their head offices, but about 85 percent of the agricultural 
development bank branches are net borrowers from their head offices (Khalily). This implies 
that the development bank branches generally make more loans than they mobilize in 
deposits while the NCB rural branches essentially mobilize deposits for transfer to their 
head offices. As a result, the loan portfolios of the NCB branches are relatively less risky 
than those for the development bank branches since lending to the head office is risk free. 
The Bangladesh Bank refinances the banks for target loans made at interest rates 
that are lower than the interest rates the banks pay on deposits. Therefore, the banks 
receive an interest subsidy if they rediscount target loans with the central bank. The 
rediscounting interest rates vary between commercial and development banks and are 
dependent upon the percentage of the disbursed target loans that each bank chooses to 
refinance. For example, the NCBs can refinance 50 to 60 percent of their disbursed target 
loans at an interest rate of 8.5 percent, while the development banks can refinance a 
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maximum of 80 percent of their disbursed loans at the same interest rate. The development 
banks refinance most of their loans and, therefore, receive a large subsidy. They are more 
oriented towards making loans than in mobilizing deposits. The interest subsidies obtained 
from refinanced loans are retained by the head office rather than passed on to individual 
branches. 
The management task of rural bank branch managers involves allocating loanable 
funds among different loan types considering local market opportunities and the differences 
in loss-adjusted lending interest rates in each market. Khalily showed that there is 
substitution between government sponsored target loans and commercial loans (made from 
own deposits and/ or borrowings from the head office) in response to differences in loss-
adjusted lending rates. This finding is consistent with the expectation that even though they 
operate in a tightly regulated environment the rural branch managers respond to variations 
in lending interest rates as they allocate their loanable funds. 
Rural branches use two major inputs - deposits and labor - in loan production. If the 
amount of deposits mobilized by rural branches is insufficient to meet loan demand, the 
branches can borrow from their head offices. The interest rates paid on different types of 
deposits, rd, are set by the Bangladesh Bank, and the wages (W) of branch employees are 
also set by the government. Branch managers can vary the cost of their deposits and their 
total wage bill by varying their mix of deposits and types of employees (officers versus staff). 
Therefore, the bank branch managers can behave as cost minimizers by changing the mix 
of deposits and labor, and by increasing labor productivity. 
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THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
A normalized profit function is used to test the relative economic efficiency of NCB 
and development bank branches so that the function can (a) differentiate between profit 
maximizing and satisficing firms, and {b) avoid simultaneous bias between quantity and price 
(Lau; Lau and Yotopoulos). Argument (a) is the major consideration in using the 
normalized profit function since the nationalized rural banks may have diverse goals set for 
them by the government. Consequently, the banks may not be profit maximizers. Since there 
is one-to-one correspondence between the production function and the normalized profit 
function, duality can be applied to indirect normalized profit to derive supply and factor 
demand functions. 
The empirical model is a quadratic normalized profit function for two major reasons: 
first, the quadratic function has the advantage of flexibility having both linear and quadratic 
terms with an arbitrary number of inputs; and second, the negative profits of some rural 
branches have restricted the use of other functional forms like the Cobb-Douglas and 
translog. The empirical model is developed following the standard neo-classical framework. 
In addition to prices of inputs and outputs, differences in profits may be explained by 
institutional characteristics and management ability {Aron; Clark; Hannan; Lucas; 
Mullineaux; Oi; Rhoades; Short). Lau argues that differences in technical efficiency may 
be due to differences in environmental and management characteristics. As a result, a bank 
dummy variable, the management ability of branch managers represented by their years of 
banking experience and schooling, and a set of control variables - age of bank, regional per-
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capita income, fixed assets, total deposits and loans - are included in the model to account 
for differences in bank behavior, their characteristics and the environment. 
The empirical quadratic normalized profit function, derived in general form, is 
specified as the actual normalized profit function in terms of behavioral characteristics. By 
dividing the indirect profit function by Ph• the price of loans to head office (~), the 
normalized profit function is expressed in general form as 
2 3 
IIa*=I: P/1L/ + (Lh-Bh)* - L rm"Xm* (1) 
~1 m~ 
1= r, 1]r; m = D, Bh, and N 
where, Xm_ refers to the variable inputs- deposits(D), borrowings from head office (Bh) and 
labor (N). Pin and rmn are, respectively, normalized prices of outputs (target and non-target 
loans) and inputs (deposits, borrowings from head office and labor). The asterick represents 
optimum level. Pt is defined as 
Note that Pt is the normalized effective price of loans adjusted for interest rate loss only, 
not adjusted for principal loan losses, because the provisions for loan losses are not made 
at the rural branch level, and the arbitrary selection of a provision rate may distort the 
empirical results. 
Since the objective is to test the relative economic efficiency of rural bank branches 
within the framework of profit maximization, the actual normalized profit function is 
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developed to incorporate the satisficing behavioral parameter. Let the behavioral normalized 
profit function (flb n) be defined as 
2 3 
nbll = LP/Lj* + (Lh-Bh)*- LKmr,,/'Xm* (2) 
i•l m•l 
where, Kmrmn refers to the effective normalized prices of variable inputs. Applying duality to 
eq. (2), the supply and factor demand functions are derived 
From (2), 
-X* 
m 
2 3 
(Lli-Bn)* = nb II - L P/'L/ + L Kmr ,/'Xm. 
i~l m•l 
Substituting (5) into (1), the actual normalized profit function is derived as follows: 
2 2 3 3 
rran = L pjnLt + nbn - L P/'L/ + L Kmrm"Xm* - .E r,,.''Xm* 
i=l i=l m=l m=l 
3 
= fib" - L (1-K,.)r m "Xm* 
m•l 
Equation (6) can be rewritten substituting eqs. (4) and (5) as 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
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3 1 ann 
IT II = nbn + ~ (l-1<: )r , __ b_ 
a L...t m 111 ::l.. 11 
msl Km or m 
(7) 
Note that if "m = 1, then the behavioral normalized profit reduces to the actual normalized 
profit function. That is, rural bank branches are profit maximizers and price efficient. 
The behavioral quadratic normalized profit function is expressed so that the partial 
derivatives in (7) can be substituted as follows: 
nn 
b 
2 3 6 
+ ~~a. p.~ r 11 + 't"' o: 7 L...t L...t 1m 1 m m L...t r' s 
~lm~ Pl 
where Z is a vector of fixed inputs and control variables. 
(8) 
Fixed inputs include fixed assets. The control variables encompass the age of the 
bank branch, regional per-capita income, management ability as defined by years of 
schooling and years of banking experience of the branch manager, and type of rural bank -
NCB versus development bank. 
Differentiating (8) with respect to prices of inputs and outputs, gives 
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(9) 
(10) 
Substituting (9) into (4), the behavioral demand function is derived as 
(11) 
By substituting (9) and (10) into (7), the actual normalized profit function is derived 
incorporating the behavioral parameters as follows: 
3 (1-t<,.) 3 
rr n = II II + ~ r "(« + ~ (X X r ll 
a b L...,; m 111 L...,; mv v v 
m=l Xm v•l 
2 6 
+ .E a.lllipi" + .E a.~:s (12) 
i&l s=l 
Note that if .t<m= 1, then n.n=f\D. The actual normalized profit, substituting equation 8 into 
eq. {11), is finally derived as 
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nn 
a 
6 1 6 6 2 
+ L «;zs + - L L «suZ7-u + L «ispinzs 
s=l 2 s=l u=l i=l 
3 2 6 
(«Ill + L «mv'KI mn + L «miPin + L «~s) (13) 
v=l i=l s=l 
Equation ( 13) is the estimating actual normalized profit function. The system of 
estimating equations consists of the actual normalized profit function (13), two supply 
equations (9) and two factor demand equations (11). There is no adding up problem in the 
quadratic function. 
The parameters in equations (9), (11) and (13) were estimated using the Maximum 
Likelihood Estimator on pooled data from 84 randomly selected rural bank branches for 
1987 and 1988. Because of the large number of parameters and the limited number of 
observations, the symmetry condition was imposed. The data for 1987 and 1988 were 
collected directly from the branches through a structured questionnaire. The prices of loans 
were defined as loss-adjusted interest rates, (1-0i)Pin, where i=target and non-target loans; 
pn is the normalized nominal interest rate; and (Ji refers to degree of interest loss varying 
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between 0 and 1 for loan type i. (Ji was determined based on the classification of overdue 
rural loans by the Bangladesh Bank. It classifies overdue loans into substandard (no payment 
received in three years), doubtful (no payment received in five years) and bad (no payment 
received in five years and some other unique circumstances such as death of borrowers). 
The central bank requires that zero, 50 percent and 100 percent provisions are made, 
respectively, for substandard, doubtful and bad loans during the year the classification is 
made. If there are no doubtful or bad overdue loans, then there is no interest loss. Thus, 
8i is the ratio of doubtful and bad overdue loans to total overdue loans. Wages and deposit 
interest rates were defined as weighted annual average wages and interest rates. Bank type 
was introduced as a dummy variable: 1 for NCBs and 0 otherwise. Reported profits were 
adjusted for interest loss. The price and profit variables were normalized by the interest of 
netput. About 38 percent of the rural branches were unprofitable based on reported profits, 
and this proportion increased to 46 percent when profits were adjusted for interest loss only. 
When profits were adjusted for both interest and principal losses, then 67 percentage of the 
rural bank branches were unprofitable. These results show the impact of loan recovery 
problems on rural bank profits. 
ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS 
The definition of the variables used in the study is reported in Table 1 and the 
parameter estimates are presented in Table 2. The empirical results are consistent with 
expectations, and most of the variables are statistically significant. Economic efficiency was 
tested both in absolute and in relative terms. The Wald chi-square test rejected the null 
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hypothesis of absolute price efficiency with respect to labor and deposits (Kw = 1, Kd = 1 ). 
The estimated coefficient of 3.29 being greater than 1 for Kw implies that the marginal cost 
of labor is less than marginal revenue. The estimated coefficient of 0.20 (less than 1) for 
Kd suggests that the marginal cost of deposits is higher than their marginal revenue. In 
other words, these results imply that labor is underutilized and deposits are costly. 
The relative price efficiency with respect to the inputs of labor and deposits was also 
tested to evaluate the marginal technical substitution between the two inputs. To equate 
the marginal rate of technical substitution with the factor price ratio, Kw must be equal to 
Kd. The Wald chi-square test rejected the null hypothesis implying that the branches are 
not operating on the profit maximizing input expansion path. 
The relative price efficiency with respect to inputs by bank type was tested by 
evaluating the parameters A39 and A49. If A39 and A49 are insignificant, then there is no 
relative price efficiency. The sign of A39 is positive, while A49 is negative. The Wald chi-
square test rejected the null hypothesis that A39 = 0 and A49 = 0. This result suggests that 
the NCB branches are relative price efficient with respect to wages, while the development 
bank branches are relative price efficient with respect to deposit interest rates. 
The relative output price differences for the NCB and development bank branches 
were tested by evaluating the interaction parameters of target and non-target interest rates 
with respect to the bank dummy variables (A19 and A29). The Wald chi-square test rejected 
the null hypothesis that Al9 = 0, but could not reject A29 = 0. Since the coefficient of A19 
is negative and significant, the development bank branches have a higher average effective 
17 
price in target loans than the commercial bank branches. In addition, there is no significant 
difference in effective non-target interest rates between commercial and development banks. 
The· relative technical efficiency by bank was examined by evaluating the parameters 
A9, ALB and ADB. The partial differentiation of profit with respect to the bank type 
variable, evaluating at the geometric means, showed that the NCB branches are not relative 
price efficient compared to the development bank branches. This result is further supported 
when relative technical efficiency is evaluated in terms of deposits and loans. 
The relative technical efficiency of banks in terms of loans and deposits is examined 
by evaluating the parameters ALB and ADB. The parameter ALB is negative and 
significant. The Wald chi-square test rejected the null hypothesis that ALB=O suggesting 
that the development bank branches are relative technical efficient with respect to loans 
made. On the other hand, the insignificant coefficient for the parameter ADB suggests that 
there is no significant difference in technical efficiency with respect to deposits. 
SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The empirical results of the profit function are consistent with expectations. The 
rural banks in Bangladesh are neither profit maximizers nor absolute price efficient. 
However, development banks are relative price efficient in deposits, while the NCBs are 
relative price efficient in wages. The rural branches are not price efficient because of the 
constraints imposed by the central bank, and because of government interventions in rural 
loan allocation and recovery. However, neither the NCB nor the development banks differ 
in the effective average price of non-target loans but the development banks have a higher 
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average effective target loan interest rates. These results suggest that development bank 
branches are more efficient in making target loans because, by definition of effective interest 
rates, their target loan loss is lower than the NCBs. This results is also supported by the 
fact that development banks are relatively more technical efficient in making loans. No bank 
is technical efficient in deposit mobilization. 
These findings are different from the previous studies cited that argued that 
commercial banks are more efficient than development banks. This study is an improvement 
over previous studies because it directly compared the rural branches of commercial and 
development banks that compete within the same market areas. It is possible, of course, 
that at the aggregate level the NCBs may be relatively more efficient than development 
banks since a larger portion of their loan portfolio is urban, while the development banks 
are generally restricted to rural operations. 
A major issue is how the efficiency of both commercial and development banks can 
be increased so that the performance of rural financial markets can be improved and the 
central bank subsidies reduced. There are two plausible alternatives: first, liberalize the 
territorial restrictions for development banks so they can open urban branches and directly 
compete with the NCBs for urban deposits and investments. By expanding their volume, they 
can also reap the benefits of their relative price and technical efficiency in rural fmancial 
markets. Alternatively, commercial banks that can cross subsidize their rural operations with 
profits from urban branches may be encouraged to increase their rural loan portfolio. This 
will reduce the demand for central bank subsidies for rural lending, and will force the urban 
bank customers to pay for the inefficiency of rural operations. But since the development 
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banks are relatively more technical and price efficient in rural areas, the first option is 
expected to be more effective because: (a) it will also encourage the NCBs to improve their 
efficiency; and (b) the amount of central bank subsidy will decline since development banks 
will be able to increasingly finance rural lending with urban deposits. 
The results of this study suggest that although agricultural development banks 
generally have had a bad experience in developing countries, it is not universally true that 
they are less efficient than commercial banks in rural lending. These results from 
Bangladesh show that both types of banks have serious problems in making and recovering 
rural loans, but the development banks have some advantages compared to commercial 
banks. This may stem from their longer experience in making loans and the fact that the 
NCBs tend to concentrate more of their efforts in mobilizing rural deposits for use in urban 
lending. Unlike the situation in some other countries, the situation in Bangladesh does not 
imply closing down development banks and encouraging commercial banks to expand their 
rural lending operations but to stimulate improvements in efficiency for both types of banks. 
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Table 1 
Parameters and Variables in the Profit Function 
Variable 
TLRATE 
NTLRATE 
WAGE 
DEPRATE 
AGE 
EDU 
EXP 
GDP 
BANK 
FXAST 
DEPOSITS 
LOANS 
LONBANK 
DEBANK 
TLRATE2 
TLNTL 
TLWAGE 
TLDEP 
TLEDU 
ELEXP 
TLGDP 
TLBANK 
NTLRATE2 
NTLWAGE 
NTLDEP 
NTLEDU 
NTLEXP 
NTLGDP 
NTLBANK 
WAGE2 
WAGEDEP 
WAGEEDU 
WAGEEXP 
WAGEBANK 
DEPRATE2 
DEPEDU 
DEPEXP 
DEPGDP 
DEPBANK 
AGE2 
EDU2 
EDUEXP 
EXP2 
GDP2 
Definition 
Target Loan Interest Rate 
Non-Target Loan Interest Rate 
Average Wage Per Employee 
Average Weighted Deposit Interest Rate 
Age of Rural Bank 
Education of Bank Manager 
Experience Level of Bank Manager 
Regional Per-Capital Income 
Dummy Variable: 1 for NCB, 0 otherwise 
Fixed Assets 
Total Deposits 
Total Loans 
Interaction of Loans and Bank Type 
Interaction of Deposits and Bank Type 
Quadratic Term of Tlrate 
Interaction of Tlrate and Ntlrate 
Interaction of Tlrate and Wage 
Interaction of Tlrate and Deprate 
Interaction of Tlrate and Education 
Interaction of Tlrate and Experience 
Interaction of Tlrate and GDP 
Interaction of Tlrate and Bank Type 
Quadratic Term of Ntlrate 
Interaction of Ntlrate and Wage 
Interaction of N tlrate and Deprate 
Interaction of Ntlrate and Education 
Interaction of Ntlrate and Experience 
Interaction of Ntlrate and GDP 
Interaction of N tlrate and Bank Type 
Quadratic Term of Wage 
Interaction of Wage and Deprate 
Interaction of Wage and Education 
Interaction of Wage and Experience 
Interaction of Wage and Bank Type 
Quadratic Term of Deprate 
Interaction of Deprate and Education 
Interaction of Deprate and Experience 
Interaction of Deprate and GDP 
Interaction of Deprate and Bank Type 
Quadratic Term of Age 
Quadratic Term of Education 
Interaction of Education and Experience 
Quadratic Term of Experience 
Quadratic Term of GDP 
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Table 2 
Parameter Estimates of the Normalized Profit Function 
Parameter Coefficient T-ratio Parameter Coefficient T-ratio 
AO -1.44 -1.81 * A23 -6.58 -4.11 * 
A1 2.38 11.08* A24 -53.60 -3.24* 
A2 0.78 2.75* A26 2.10 1.45** 
A3 -3.73 -5.24* A27 -4.53 -2.73* 
Kw 3.29 6.37* A28 8.81 0.76 
A4 -0.19 -2.67* A29 -0.02 -0.05 
Kd 0.20 7.17* A33 0.78 1.11 *** 
AS 2.71 1.12*** A34 40.94 5.72* 
A6 -2.05 -0.29 A36 -1.50 -3.11 * 
A7 8.21 1.18*** A37 -0.33 -1.94* 
AS -78.74 -4.37* A39 1.95 2.81* 
A9 1.96 2.52* A44 -1,070.20 -3.05* 
AF -0.38 -1.85* A46 -8.28 -5.22* 
AD -0.04 -1.21 *** A47 4.51 2.41 * 
AL 0.16 20.42* A48 64.33 2.46* 
All 288.94 6.99* A49 -0.12 -1.57** 
A12 -28.94 -1.43** A55 -0.07 -0.98 
A13 3.27 1.08*** A66 0.18 0.56 
A14 -15.84 -0.52 A77 -0.14 -1.66* 
A16 -10.14 -3.17* A67 0.15 0.62 
A17 -1.01 -0.56 A88 5.00 1.76 
A18 24.43 2.28* ADB 0.01 0.42 
A19 -1.25 -5.05* ALB -0.09 -8.42 
A22 81.29 3.26 
Note: * S~nificant at 5/bercent level. 
* * ~cant at !ercent level. 
*** 1gnificant at 1 percent level. 
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